[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[2] PEREZ ET UX.
v.
[3] CAMPBELL, SUPERINTENDENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, ARIZONA
[4] HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, ET AL.
[5] No. 5175
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1971.SCT.105 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[6] Date Decided: June 1, 1971
[7] SYLLABUS
[8] The provision that "discharge in bankruptcy following the
rendering of any such judgment [as a result of an automobile accident]
shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of
this article," contained in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1163 , part of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which the Arizona courts have
construed as having as "its principal purpose the protection of the
public using the highways from financial hardship which may result from
the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons," directly
conflicts with § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, which states that a discharge
in bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments, and
is thus unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy Clause. Kesler v.
Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S.
33, have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent
with the controlling principle that state legislation that frustrates
the full effectiveness of federal law is invalidated by the Supremacy
Clause. Pp. 644-656.
[9] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT.
[10] APPELLATE PANEL:
[11] White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black,
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and
dissenting as to petitioner Adolfo Perez, in which Burger, C. J., and
Harlan and Stewart, JJ., joined, post, p. 657.
[12] DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUSTICE WHITE
[13] This case raises an important issue concerning the construction
of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution -- whether Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. 28-1163 (1956), which is part of Arizona's Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act, is invalid under that clause as being in conflict
with the mandate of § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 35,
providing that receipt of a discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges all
but certain specified judgments. The courts below, concluding that this
case was controlled by Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S.
153 (1962), and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), two earlier
opinions of this Court dealing with alleged conflicts between the
Bankruptcy Act and state financial responsibility laws, ruled against
the claim of conflict and upheld the Arizona statute.
[14] On July 8, 1965, petitioner Adolfo Perez, driving a car
registered in his name, was involved in an automobile accident in
Tucson, Arizona. The Perez automobile was not covered by liability
insurance at the time of the collision. The driver of the second car was
the minor daughter of Leonard Pinkerton, and in September 1966 the
Pinkertons sued Mr. and Mrs. Perez in state court for personal injuries
and property damage sustained in the accident. On October 31, 1967, the
petitioners confessed judgment in this suit, and a judgment order was
entered against them on November 8, 1967, for $ 2,425.98 plus court
costs.
[15] Mr. and Mrs. Perez each filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
in Federal District Court on November 6, 1967. Each of them duly
scheduled the judgment debt to the Pinkertons. The District Court
entered orders on July 8, 1968, discharging both Mr. and Mrs. Perez from
all debts and claims provable against their estates, including the
Pinkerton judgment. 11 U. S. C. § 35; Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467
(1925).
[16] During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, the
provisions of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act came
into play. Although only one provision of the Arizona Act is relevant to
the issue presented by this case, it is appropriate to describe the
statutory scheme in some detail. The Arizona statute is based on the
Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act promulgated by the
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety.*fn1 Articles 1 and 2
of the Act deal, respectively, with definitional matters and
administration.
[17] The substantive provisions begin in Art. 3, which requires the
posting of financial security by those involved in accidents. Section
28-1141 of that article requires suspension of licenses for unlawful
failure to report accidents, and § 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971) provides
that within 60 days of the receipt of an accident report the
Superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Highway Department
shall suspend the driver's license of the operator and the registration
of the owner of a car involved in an accident "unless such operator or
owner or both shall deposit security in a sum which is sufficient in
the judgment of the superintendent to satisfy any judgment or judgments
for damages resulting from the accident as may be recovered against the
operator or owner." Under the same section, notice of such suspension
and the amount of security required must be sent to the owner and
operator not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of the
suspension. This section does not apply if the owner or the operator
carried liability insurance or some other covering bond at the time of
the accident, or if such individual had previously qualified as a
self-insurer under § 28-1222. Other exceptions to the requirement that
security be posted are stated in § 28-1143.*fn2 If none of these
exceptions applies, the suspension continues until: (1) the person whose
privileges were suspended deposits the security required under § 28-1142
(Supp. 1970-1971); (2) one year elapses from the date of the accident
and the person whose privileges were suspended files proof with the
Superintendent that no one has initiated an action for damages arising
from the accident; (3) evidence is filed with the superintendent that a
release from liability, an adjudication of nonliability, a confession of
judgment, or some other written settlement agreement has been
entered.*fn3 As far as the record in the instant case shows, the
provisions of Art. 3 were not invoked against petitioners, and the
constitutional validity of these provisions is, of course, not before us
for decision.
[18] Article 4 of the Arizona Act, which includes the only provision
at issue here, deals with suspension of licenses and registrations for
nonpayment of judgments. Interestingly, it is only when the judgment
debtor in an automobile accident lawsuit -- usually an owner-operator
like Mr. Perez -- fails to respond to a judgment entered against him
that he must overcome two hurdles in order to regain his driving
privileges. Section 28-1161, the first section of Art. 4, requires the
state court clerk or judge, when a judgment*fn4 has remained unsatisfied
for 60 days after entry, to forward a certified copy of the judgment to
the superintendent.*fn5 This was done in the present case, and on March
13, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Perez were served with notice that their drivers'
licenses and registration were suspended pursuant to § 28-1162 .*fn6
Under other provisions of Art. 4, such suspension is to continue until
the judgment is paid,*fn7 and § 28-1163 specifically provides that "[a]
discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment
shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of
this article." In addition to requiring satisfaction of the judgment
debt, § 28-1163 provides that the license and registration "shall remain
suspended and shall not be renewed, nor shall any license or
registration be thereafter issued in the name of the person . . . until
the person gives proof of financial responsibility" for a future
period.*fn8 Again, the validity of this limited requirement that some
drivers post evidence of financial responsibility for the future in
order to regain driving privileges is not questioned here. Nor is the
broader issue of whether a State may require proof of financial
responsibility as a precondition for granting driving privileges to
anyone before us for decision. What is at issue here is the power of a
State to include as part of this comprehensive enactment designed to
secure compensation for automobile accident victims a section providing
that a discharge in bankruptcy of the automobile accident tort judgment
shall have no effect on the judgment debtor's obligation to repay the
judgment creditor, at least insofar as such repayment may be enforced by
the withholding of driving privileges by the State. It was that
question, among others, which petitioners raised after suspension of
their licenses and registration by filing a complaint in Federal
District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and requesting
a three-judge court. They asserted several constitutional violations,
and also alleged that § 28-1163 was in direct conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act and was thus violative of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.*fn9 In support of their complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Perez
filed affidavits stating that the suspension of their licenses and
registration worked both physical and financial hardship upon them and
their children. The District Judge granted the petitioners leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, but thereafter granted the respondents'
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, citing Kesler and Reitz.*fn10 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, relying on the same two decisions. 421 F.2d 619 (CA9
1970). We granted certiorari. 400 U.S. 818 (1970).
I
[19] Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal
statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a
two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two
statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they
are in conflict. In the present case, both statutes have been
authoritatively construed. In Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273,
380 P. 2d 136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that "the
Financial Responsibility Act has for its principal purpose the
protection of the public using the highways from financial hardship
which may result from the use of automobiles by financially
irresponsible persons." 93 Ariz., at 280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Arizona
court has consistently adhered to this construction of its legislation,
see Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558, 456 P. 2d 925, 928 (1969);
New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P.
2d 914 (1969); Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 243, 428 P. 2d 98,
100 (1967); Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44, 47, 424 P. 2d 172,
175 (1967); Hastings v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 302, 306, 413 P. 2d 767, 770
(1966); Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287, 290, 380 P. 2d
145, 147 (1963), and we are bound by its rulings. See, e. g., General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 337 (1944). Although the
dissent seems unwilling to accept the Arizona Supreme Court's
construction of the statute as expressive of the Act's primary
purpose*fn11 and indeed characterizes that construction as unfortunate,
post, at 667, a reading of the provisions outlined above leaves the
impression that the Arizona Court's description of the statutory
purpose is not only logical but persuasive. The sole emphasis in the Act
is one of providing leverage for the collection of damages from drivers
who either admit that they are at fault or are adjudged negligent. The
victim of another driver's carelessness, if he so desires, can exclude
the superintendent entirely from the process of "deterring" a repetition
of that driver's negligence.*fn12 Further, if an accident is litigated
and a special verdict that the defendant was negligent and the plaintiff
contributorily negligent is entered, the result in Arizona, as in many
other States, is that there is no liability for damages arising from the
accident. Heimke v. Munoz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P. 2d 107 (1970); McDowell
v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P. 2d 869 (1968). Under the Safety
Responsibility Act, the apparent result of such a judgment is that no
consequences are visited upon either driver although both have been
found to have driven carelessly. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-1143
(4), 28-1144 (3). Moreover, there are no provisions requiring drivers
proved to be careless to stay off the roads for a period of time. Nor
are there provisions requiring drivers who have caused accidents to
attend some kind of driver improvement course, a technique that is not
unfamiliar in sentencing for traffic offenses.
[20] Turning to the federal statute, the construction of the
Bankruptcy Act is similarly clear. This Court on numerous occasions has
stated that "one of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act" is to
give debtors "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Accord, e. g.,
Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943);
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555 (1915). There can be no
doubt, given Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925), that Congress
intended this "new opportunity" to include freedom from most kinds of
pre-existing tort judgments.
II
[21] With the construction of both statutes clearly established, we
proceed immediately to the constitutional question whether a state
statute that protects judgment creditors from "financially irresponsible
persons" is in conflict with a federal statute that gives discharged
debtors a new start "unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt." As early as Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824),
Chief Justice Marshall stated the governing principle -- that "acts of
the State Legislatures . . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to
the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution," are
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Id., at 211 (emphasis added). Three
decades ago MR. JUSTICE BLACK, after reviewing the precedents, wrote in
a similar vein that, while "this Court, in considering the validity of
state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same
subject, ha[d] made use of the following expressions: conflicting;
contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and
interference. . . in the final analysis," our function is to determine
whether a challenged state statute "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Since Hines the
Court has frequently adhered to this articulation of the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause. See, e. g., Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389
U.S. 235, 240 (1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229 (1964); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air
Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (dictum); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663, 666 (1962); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542-543 (1945); Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
Indeed, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963), a recent case in which the Court was closely divided, all nine
Justices accepted the Hines test. Id., at 141 (opinion of the Court),
165 (dissenting opinion).
[22] Both Kesler*fn13 and Reitz, however, ignored this controlling
principle. The Court in Kesler conceded that Utah's financial
responsibility law left "the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the
discharged debt," 369 U.S., at 171, made "it more probable that the debt
will be paid despite the discharge," id., at 173, and thereby made "some
inroad . . . on the consequences of bankruptcy. . . ." Id., at 171.
Utah's statute, in short, frustrated Congress' policy of giving
discharged debtors a new start. But the Kesler majority was not
concerned by this frustration. In upholding the statute, the majority
opinion did not look to the effect of the legislation but simply
asserted that the statute was "not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted
Creditors," id., at 174, and was "not designed to aid collection of
debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible driving. . . ." Id.,
at 169. The majority, that is, looked to the purpose of the state
legislation and upheld it because the purpose was not to circumvent the
Bankruptcy Act but to promote highway safety; those in dissent, however,
were concerned that, whatever the purpose of the Utah Act, its "plain
and inevitable effect . . . [was] to create a powerful weapon for
collection of a debt from which [the] bankrupt [had] been released by
federal law." Id., at 183. Such a result, they argued, left "the States
free . . . to impair . . . an important and historic policy of this
Nation . . . embodied in its bankruptcy laws." Id., at 185.
[23] The opinion of the Court in Reitz was similarly concerned, not
with the fact that New York's financial responsibility law frustrated
the operation of the Bankruptcy Act, but with the purpose of the law,
which was divined as the promotion of highway safety. As the Court said:
[24] "The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless
driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce
a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be
allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be
frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its
provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and,
accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy
should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation
is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement
of permissible state policy touching highway safety." 314 U.S., at 37.
[25] The dissenting opinion written by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS for
himself and three others noted that the New York legislation put "the
bankrupt . . . at the creditor's mercy," with the results that "in
practical effect the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even worse, a
position than if the state had made it possible for a creditor to attach
his future wages" and that "bankruptcy . . . [was not] the sanctuary for
hapless debtors which Congress intended." Id., at 41.
[26] We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of Kesler
and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as
long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in
mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is at
odds with the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases,
such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all
unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative
committee report articulating some state interest or policy -- other
than frustration of the federal objective -- that would be tangentially
furthered by the proposed state law. In view of the consequences, we
certainly would not apply the Kesler doctrine in all Supremacy Clause
cases. Although it is possible to argue that Kesler and Reitz are
somehow confined to cases involving either bankruptcy or highway safety,
analysis discloses no reason why the States should have broader power to
nullify federal law in these fields than in others. Thus, we conclude
that Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to the extent
they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state
legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is
rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause. Section 28-1163 thus may not
stand.
III
[27] Even accepting the Supremacy Clause analysis of Kesler and Reitz
-- that is, looking to the purpose rather than the effect of state laws
-- those decisions are not dispositive of this case. Just as Kesler went
a step beyond Reitz and broadened the holding of the earlier case, 369
U.S., at 184 (dissenting opinion), so in the present case the
respondents asked the courts below and this Court to expand the holdings
of the two previous cases. The distinction between Kesler and Reitz and
this case lies in the State's expressed legislative purpose.
[28] Kesler and Reitz were aberrational in their treatment of this
question as well. The majority opinions in both cases assumed, without
citation of state court authority or any indication that such precedent
was unavailable, that the purpose of the state financial responsibility
laws there under attack was not provision of relief to creditors but
rather deterrence of irresponsible driving. The assumption was, in
effect, that all state legislatures which had enacted provisions such as
§ 28-1163 had concluded that an uninsured motorist about to embark in
his car would be more careful on the road if he did not have available
what the majority in Kesler cavalierly characterized as an "easy refuge
in bankruptcy." 369 U.S., at 173.*fn14 Passing the question of whether
the Court gave sufficient attention to binding state interpretations of
state legislative purpose and conceding that it employed proper
technique in divining as obvious from their face the aim of the state
enactments, the present case raises doubts about whether the Court was
correct even in its basic assumptions. The Arizona Supreme Court has
declared that Arizona's Safety Responsibility Act "has for its principal
purpose the protection of the public . . . from financial hardship"
resulting from involvement in traffic accidents with uninsured motorists
unable to respond to a judgment. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz., at
280, 380 P. 2d, at 140. The Court in Kesler was able to declare,
although the source of support is unclear, that the Utah statute could
be upheld because it was "not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted
Creditors" or a statute "designed to aid collection of debts." 369
U.S., at 174, 169. But here the respondents urge us to uphold precisely
the sort of statute that Kesler would have stricken down -- one with a
declared purpose to protect judgment creditors "from financial hardship"
by giving them a powerful weapon with which to force bankrupts to pay
their debts despite their discharge. Whereas the Acts in Kesler and
Reitz had the effect of frustrating federal law but had, the Court said,
no such purpose, the Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose.
Believing as we do that Kesler and Reitz are not in harmony with sound
constitutional principle, they certainly should not be extended to cover
this new and distinguishable case.
IV
[29] One final argument merits discussion. The dissent points out
that the District of Columbia Code contains an anti-discharge provision
similar to that included in the Arizona Act. Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code Ann. § 40-464
(1967), 68 Stat. 132. In light of our decision today, the sum of the
argument is to draw into question the constitutional validity of the
District's anti-discharge section, for as noted in the dissent the
Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added). It is asserted that
"Congress must have [30] regarded the two statutes as consistent and
compatible," post, at 665, but such an argument assumes a modicum of
legislative attention to the question of consistency. The D.C. Code
section does, of course, refer specifically to discharges, but its
passage may at most be viewed as evidencing an opinion of Congress on
the meaning of the general discharge provision enacted by an earlier
Congress and interpreted by this Court as early as 1925. See Lewis v.
Roberts, supra. In fact, in passing the initial and amended version of
the District of Columbia financial responsibility law, Congress gave no
attention to the interaction of the anti-discharge section with the
Bankruptcy Act.*fn15 Moreover, the legislative history is quite clear
that when Congress dealt with the subject of financial responsibility
laws for the District, it based its work upon the efforts of the uniform
commissioners which had won enactment in other States.*fn16
[30] Had Congress focused on the interaction between this minor
subsection of the rather lengthy financial responsibility act and the
discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Act, it would have been
immediately apparent to the legislators that the only constitutional
method for so defining the scope and effect of a discharge in bankruptcy
was by amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, which by its terms is a uniform
statute applicable in the States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia. 11 U. S. C. 1 (29). To follow any other course would obviously
be to legislate in such a way that a discharge in bankruptcy means one
thing in the District of Columbia and something else in the States --
depending on state law -- a result explicitly prohibited by the
uniformity requirement in the constitutional authorization to Congress
to enact bankruptcy legislation.
V
[31] From the foregoing, we think it clear that § 28-1163 of the
Arizona Safety Responsibility Act is constitutionally invalid. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[32] It is so ordered.
[33] CASE RESOLUTION
[34] 421 F.2d 619, reversed and remanded.
[35] MINORITY OPINION
[36] MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART.
[37] I concur in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissent
as to petitioner Adolfo Perez.
I
[38] The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death
toll of all our wars.1 The country is fragmented about the current
conflict in Southeast Asia, but I detect little genuine public concern
about what takes place in our very midst and on our daily travel
routes. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring
opinion).
[39] This being so, it is a matter of deep concern to me that today
the Court lightly brushes aside and overrules two cases where it had
upheld a representative attempt by the States to regulate traffic and
where the Court had considered and rejected the very Supremacy Clause
argument that it now discovers to be so persuasive.2
II
[40] I think it is desirable to stress certain factual details. The
facts, of course, are only alleged, but for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, we are to accept them as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964).
[41] Arizona is a community property state. Adolfo and Emma Perez are
husband and wife. They were resident citizens of Arizona at the time of
the accident in Tucson in July 1965. Mr. Perez was driving an automobile
registered in his name. He was alone. Mrs. Perez was not with him and
had nothing to do with her husband's operation of the car on that day.
The automobile, however, was the property of the marital community.
[42] Accompanying, and supposedly supportive of, the Perez complaint
in the present suit, were affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Perez. These
affidavits asserted that the Perezes had four minor children ages 6 to
17; that Emma is a housewife and not otherwise gainfully employed; that
Emma's inability to drive has required their two older children, aged 17
and 14, to walk one and a half miles to high school and the third child,
aged 9, one mile to elementary school, with consequent nosebleeding;
that Emma's inability to drive has caused inconvenience and financial
injury; and that Adolfo's inability to drive has caused inconvenience
because he must rely on others for transportation or use public
facilities or walk.
III The Statutory Plan
[43] Arizona has a comprehensive statutory plan for the regulation of
vehicles upon its highways. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 28. Among the
State's efforts to assure responsibility in this area of increasing
national concern are its Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and
Chauffeurs' License Act (c. 4), its Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways (c. 6), and its Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act
(c. 7).3
[44] The challenged § 28-1163 is a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act. The Act's provisions are not unfamiliar. There is
imposed upon the Motor Vehicle Division Superintendent the duty to
suspend the license of each operator, and the registration of each
owner, of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily
injury or death or property damage to any one person in excess of $
100, except, among other situations, where proof of financial
responsibility, as by the deposit of appropriate security or by the
presence of a liability policy of stated minimum coverage, is afforded.
§§ 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971), 28-1143, and 28-1167. The suspension, once
imposed, remains until the required security is deposited or until one
year has elapsed and no action for damages has been instituted. 28-1144.
If the registrant or operator fails, within 60 days, to satisfy an
adverse motor vehicle final judgment, as defined in § 28-1102 (2) (Supp.
1970-1971), the court clerk has the duty to notify the Superintendent
and the latter to suspend the license and registration of the judgment
debtor. §§ 28-1161 and 28-1162 . But if the judgment creditor consents
in writing that the debtor be allowed to retain his license and
registration, the Superintendent in his discretion may grant that
privilege. § 28-1162 . Otherwise the suspension remains in effect until
the judgment is satisfied. § 28-1163 . Payments of stated amounts are
deemed to satisfy the judgment, § 28-1164 (Supp. 1970-1971), and
court-approved installment payment of the judgment will preserve the
license and registration, § 28-1165.
IV Adolfo Perez
[45] Inasmuch as the case is before us on the motion of defendants
below to dismiss the Perez complaint that alleged Adolfo's driving
alone, the collision, and the judgment in favor of the Pinkertons, it is
established, for present purposes, that the Pinkerton judgment was based
on Adolfo's negligence in driving the Perez vehicle.
[46] Adolfo emphasizes, and I recognize, that under Art. I, § 8, cl.
4, of the Constitution, Congress has possessed the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States"; that, of course, this power, when exercised, as it has been
since 1800, is "exclusive," New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass &
Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 661 (1876), and "unrestricted and paramount,"
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929); that one of
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh . .
. ," Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554-555 (1915); and that a bankrupt by his discharge receives "a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by
the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt," Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
[47] From these general and accepted principles it is argued that §
28-1163 , with its insistence upon post-discharge payment as a condition
for license and registration restoration, is violative of the Bankruptcy
Act and, thus, of the Supremacy Clause.
[48] As Mr. Perez acknowledges in his brief here, the argument is not
new. It was raised with respect to a New York statute in Reitz v.
Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), and was rejected there by a five-to-four
vote:
[49] "The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its
consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of
regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of
automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted
by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees
and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process. .
. .
[50] . . . .
[51] "The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless
driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce
a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be
allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be
frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its
provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and,
accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy
should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation
is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement
of permissible state policy touching highway safety." 314 U.S., at
36-37.
[52] Left specifically unanswered in that case, but acknowledged as a
"serious question," 314 U.S., at 38, was the claim that interim
amendments of the statutes gave the creditor control over the initiation
and duration of the suspension and thus violated the Bankruptcy Act. The
dissenters, speaking through MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concluded that the
constitutional issue "cannot be escaped . . . unless we are to overlook
the realities of collection methods." 314 U.S., at 43.
[53] Nine years ago, the same argument again was advanced, this time
with respect to Utah's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and
again was rejected. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153,
158-174 (1962). There, Utah's provisions relating to duration of
suspension and restoration, more stringent than those of New York, were
challenged. It was claimed that the statutes made the State a
"collecting agent for the creditor rather than furthering an interest in
highway safety," and that suspension that could be perpetual "only
renders the collection pressure more effective." 369 U.S., at 169. There
was a troublesome jurisdictional issue in the case, the decision as to
which was later overruled, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124-129
(1965), but on the merits the Court, by a five-to-three vote, sustained
all the Utah statutes then under attack:4
[54] "But the lesson Zavelo [v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913)] and
Spalding [v. New York ex rel. Backus, 4 How. 21 (1845)] teach is that
the Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any consequence
whatsoever to a debt which has been discharged.
[55] "The Utah Safety Responsibility Act leaves the bankrupt to some
extent burdened by the discharged debt. Certainly some inroad is made on
the consequences of bankruptcy if the creditor can exert pressure to
recoup a discharged debt, or part of it, through the leverage of the
State's licensing and registration power. But the exercise of this
power is deemed vital to the State's well-being, and, from the point of
view of its interests, is wholly unrelated to the considerations which
propelled Congress to enact a national bankruptcy law. There are here
overlapping interests which cannot be uncritically resolved by exclusive
regard to the money consequences of enforcing a widely adopted measure
for safeguarding life and safety.
[56] ". . . At the heart of the matter are the complicated demands of
our federalism.
[57] "Are the differences between the Utah statute and that of New
York so significant as to make a constitutionally decisive difference?
A State may properly decide, as forty-five have done, that the prospect
of a judgment that must be paid in order to regain driving privileges
serves as a substantial deterrent to unsafe driving. We held in Reitz
that it might impose this requirement despite a discharge, in order not
to exempt some drivers from appropriate protection of public safety by
easy refuge in bankruptcy. . . . To whatever extent these provisions
make it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge,
each no less reflects the State's important deterrent interest. Congress
had no thought of amending the Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law
for the District of Columbia; we do not believe Utah's identical statute
conflicts with it either.
[58] "Utah is not using its police power as a devious collecting
agency under the pressure of organized creditors. Victims of careless
car drivers are a wholly diffused group of shifting and uncertain
composition, not even remotely united by a common financial interest.
The Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted
Creditors. It is not directed to bankrupts as such. Though in a
particular case a discharged bankrupt who wants to have his rightfully
suspended license and registration restored may have to pay the amount
of a discharged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the
purposes served by bankruptcy legislation is essentially tangential."
369 U.S., at 170-174 (footnotes omitted).
[59] MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissented on
the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-15 (1953), essentially identical
to Arizona's § 28-1163 , operated to deny the judgment debtor the
federal immunity given him by § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act and, hence,
violated the Supremacy Clause. 369 U.S., at 182-185.
[60] The Perezes in their brief, p. 7, acknowledge that the Arizona
statutes challenged here "are not unlike the Utah ones discussed in
Kesler." Accordingly, Adolfo Perez is forced to urge that Reitz and the
remaining portion of Kesler that bears upon the subject be overruled.
The Court bows to that argument.
[61] I am not prepared to overrule those two cases and to undermine
their control over Adolfo Perez' posture here. I would adhere to the
rulings and I would hold that the States have an appropriate and
legitimate concern with highway safety; that the means Arizona has
adopted with respect to one in Adolfo's position (that is, the driver
whose negligence has caused harm to others and whose judgment debt based
on that negligence remains unsatisfied) in its attempt to assure driving
competence and care on the part of its licensees, as well as to protect
others, is appropriate state legislation; and that the Arizona statute,
like its Utah counterpart, despite the tangential effect upon
bankruptcy, does not operate in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act or
conflict with it to the extent it may rightly be said to violate the
Supremacy Clause.
[62] Other factors of significance are also to be noted:
[63] 1. The Court struggles to explain away the parallel District of
Columbia situation installed by Congress itself. Section 40-464 of the
D.C. Code Ann. (1967) in all pertinent parts is identical with Arizona's
§ 28-1163 . The only difference is in the final word, namely, "article"
in the Arizona statute and "chapter" in the District's. The District of
Columbia statute was enacted as § 48 of Pub. Law 365 of May 25, 1954,
effective one year later, 68 Stat. 132. This is long after the
Bankruptcy Act was placed on the books and, indeed, long after this
Court's decision in Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925), that a
personal injury judgment is a provable claim in bankruptcy. Surely, as
the Court noted in Kesler, 369 U.S., at 173-174, "Congress had no
thought of amending the Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law for the
District of Columbia." See Lee v. England, 206 F.Supp. 957 (DC 1962).
Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and
compatible, and cannot have thought otherwise for the last 35 years.5 If
the statutes truly are in tension, then I would suppose that the later
one, that is, § 40-464, would be the one to prevail. Gibson v. United
States, 194 U.S. 182, 192 (1904). But, if so, we then have something
less than the "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States" that Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution
commands, for the law would be one way in Arizona (and, by the present
overruling of Reitz and Kesler, in New York and in Utah) and the other
way in the District of Columbia. Unfortunately, such is the dilemma in
which the Court's decision today leaves us.
[64] 2. Arizona's § 28-1163 also has its counterparts in the statutes
of no less than 44 other States.6 It is, after all, or purports to be,
a uniform Act. I suspect the Court's decision today will astonish those
members of the Congress who were responsible for the District of
Columbia Code provision, and will equally astonish the legislatures of
those 44 States that absorbed assurance from Reitz and Kesler that the
provision withstands constitutional attack.
[65] 3. The Court rationalizes today's decision by saying that Kesler
went beyond Reitz and that the present case goes beyond Kesler, and that
that is too much. It would justify this by noting the Arizona Supreme
Court's characterization of the Arizona statute as one for the
protection of the public from financial hardship and by concluding, from
this description, that the statute is not a public highway safety
measure, but rather a financial one protective, I assume the implication
is, of insurance companies. The Arizona court's characterization of its
statute, I must concede, is not a fortunate one. However, I doubt that
that court, in evolving that description, had any idea of the
consequences to be wrought by this Court's decision today. I am not
willing to say that the description in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93
Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 136 (1963), embraced the only purpose of the
State's legislation. Section 28-1163 is a part of the State's Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and does not constitute an isolated
subchapter of that Act concerned only with financial well-being of the
victims of drivers' negligence. In any event, as the Court's opinion
makes clear, the decision today would be the same however the Arizona
court had described its statute.
[66] 4. While stare decisis "is no immutable principle,"7 as a glance
at the Court's decisions over the last 35 years, or over almost any
period for that matter, will disclose, it seems to me that the principle
does have particular validity and application in a situation such as the
one confronting the Court in this case. Here is a statute concerning
motor vehicle responsibility, a substantive matter peculiarly within the
competence of the State rather than the National Government. Here is a
serious and conscientious attempt by a State to legislate and do
something about the problem that, in terms of death and bodily injury
and adverse civilian effect, is so alarming. Here is a statute widely
adopted by the several States and legitimately assumed by the lawmakers
of those States to be consistent with the Bankruptcy Act, an assumption
rooted in positive, albeit divided, decision by this Court, not once,
but twice. And here is a statute the Congress itself, the very author
of the Bankruptcy Act, obviously considered consistent therewith. I fear
that the Court today makes stare decisis meaningless and downgrades it
to the level of a tool to be used or cast aside as convenience dictates.
I doubt if Justices Roberts, Stone, Reed, Frankfurter, Murphy, Warren,
Clark, HARLAN, BRENNAN, and STEWART, who constituted the respective
majorities on the merits in Reitz and Kesler, were all that wrong.
[67] 5. Adolfo's affidavit protestation of hardship goes no further
than to assert a resulting reliance upon friends and neighbors or upon
public transportation or upon walking to cover the seven miles from his
home to his place of work; this is inconvenience, perhaps, even in this
modern day when we are inclined to equate convenience with necessity and
to eschew what prior generations routinely accepted as part of the day's
labor, but it falls far short of the "great harm" and "irreparable
injury" that he otherwise asserts only in general and conclusory terms.
Perez' professed inconvenience stands vividly and starkly in contrast
with his victims' injuries. But as is so often the case, the victim,
once damaged, is seemingly beyond concern. What seems to become
important is the perpetrator's inconvenience.
[68] 6. It is conceded that Arizona constitutionally could prescribe
liability insurance as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
license and registration.
V Emma Perez
[69] Emma Perez' posture is entirely different. Except for possible
emotional strain resulting from her husband's predicament, she was in no
way involved in the Pinkerton accident. She was not present when it
occurred and no negligence or nonfeasance on her part contributed to it.
Emma thus finds herself in a position where, having done no wrong, she
nevertheless is deprived of her operator's license. This comes about
because the Perez vehicle concededly was community property under 25-211
, and because, for some reason, the judgment was confessed as to her as
well as against her husband. As one amicus brief describes it, Emma, a
fault-free driver, "is without her license solely because she is the
impecunious wife of an impecunious, negligent driver in a community
property state."
[70] At this point a glance at the Arizona community property system
perhaps is indicated. Emma Perez was a proper nominal defendant in the
Pinkerton lawsuit, see Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 367 P. 2d 245
(1961), but she was not a necessary party there. First National Bank v.
Reeves, 27 Ariz. 508, 517, 234 P. 556, 560 (1925); Bristol v. Moser, 55
Ariz. 185, 190-191, 99 P. 2d 706, 709 (1940). However, a judgment
against a marital community based upon the husband's tort committed
without the wife's knowledge or consent does not bind her separate
property. Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 138, 185 P. 2d 304, 310 (1947).
The judgment would, of course, bind the community property vehicle to
the extent permitted by Arizona law. See § 33-1124.
[71] In Arizona during coverture personal property may be disposed of
only by the husband. § 25-211 . The community personality is subject to
the husband's dominance in management and control. Mortensen v. Knight,
81 Ariz. 325, 334, 305 P. 2d 463, 469 (1956). The wife has no power to
make contracts binding the common property. § 25-214 . Her power to
contract is limited to necessaries for herself and the children. 25-215.
Thus, as the parties appear to agree, she could neither enter into a
contract for the purchase of an automobile nor acquire insurance upon it
except by use of her separate property.
[72] The Court of Appeals ruled that Mrs. Perez' posture, as the
innocent wife who had no connection with the negligent conduct that led
to the confession and entry of judgment, was, under the logic of Kesler
and Reitz, "a distinction without a significant difference" even though
"she had no alternative." 421 F.2d 619, 622-623. The court opined that
the spouse can acquire an automobile with her separate funds and that
negligent operation of it on separate business would then not call into
question the liability of the other spouse. It described Emma's legal
status as "closely analogous" to that of the automobile owner who
permits another person to drive, and it regarded as authority cases
upholding a State's right to revoke the owner's license and registration
after judgment had been entered against him and remains unsatisfied. The
husband was described, under Arizona law, as the managing agent of the
wife in the control of the community automobile, and "the driver's
licenses of both husband and wife are an integral part of the ball of
wax, which is the basis of the Arizona community property laws." The
loss of her license "is the price an Arizona wife must pay for negligent
driving by her husband of the community vehicle" when the resulting
judgment is not paid. 421 F.2d, at 624.
[73] For what it is worth, Emma's affidavit is far more persuasive of
hardship than Adolfo's. She relates the family automobile to the
children and their medical needs and to family purchasing at distant
discount stores. But I need not, and would not, decide her case on the
representations in her affidavit.
[74] I conclude that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, in its
application to Emma Perez and her operator's license, does not comport
with the purpose and policy of the Bankruptcy Act and that it effects a
result at odds with the Supremacy Clause. Emma's subordinate position
with respect to the community's personal property, and her complete lack
of connection with the Pinkerton accident and with the negligence that
occasioned it, are strange accompaniments for the deprival of her
operator's license. The nexus to the state police power, claimed to
exist because of her marriage to the negligent Adolfo and the community
property character of the accident vehicle, is, for me, elusive and
unconvincing. The argument based on Arizona's appropriate concern with
highway safety, that prompts me to adhere to the Reitz-Kesler rationale
for Adolfo, is drained of all force and persuasion when applied to the
innocent Emma. Despite the underlying community property legal theory,
Emma had an incident of ownership in the family automobile only because
it was acquired during coverture. She had no "control" over Adolfo's use
of the vehicle and she could not forbid his use as she might have been
able to do were it her separate property. Thus, the state purpose in
deterring the reckless driver and his unsafe driving has only undeserved
punitive application to Emma. She is personally penalized not only with
respect to the operation of the Perez car but also with respect to any
automobile.
[75] I therefore would hold that under these circumstances the
State's action, under § 28-1163 , in withholding from Emma her
operator's license is not, within the language of Reitz, an appropriate
means for Arizona "to insure competence and care on the part of [Emma]
and to protect others" using the highways, 314 U.S., at 36, and that it
interferes with the paramount federal interest in her bankruptcy
discharge and violates the Supremacy Clause.
[76] [For Appendix to opinion of BLACKMUN, J., see post, p. 672.]
[77] From 1900 through 1969, motor-vehicle deaths in the U.S.
totalled nearly 1,800,000. Deaths of U.S. military personnel in all wars
are shown below. In making comparisons, it must be kept in mind that
nearly everyone is exposed to motor-vehicle accidents but relatively few
are exposed to war deaths.
[78] U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES IN PRINCIPAL WARS
[79] War Deaths Nonfatal
[80] Total Battle Others Wounds
[81] Total+ 643,052+ § 1,540,000
[82] 1,146,000 503,200
[83] Revolutionary War (1775-83) 4,435 4,435
N.A. 6,188
[84] War of 1812 (1812-15) 2,260 2,260
N.A. 4,505
[85] Mexican War (1846-48) 13,283 1,733
11,550 4,152
[86] Civil War (1861-65)
[87] Union Forces 364,511 140,414
224,097 281,881
[88] Confederate Forces 133,821 74,524
59,297 N.A.
[89] Spanish-American War (1898) 2,446 385
2,061 1,662
[90] World War I (1917-18) 116,708 53,513
63,195 204,002
[91] World War II (1941-45) 407,316 292,131
115,185 670,846
[92] Korean War (1950-53) 54,246 33,629
20,617 103,284
[93] Viet Nam War (1961-69) 47,251 40,028
7,223 262,799
[94] Source: Office of Secretary of Defense.
[95] § Incomplete and rounded.
[96] N. A. Not available.
[97] Accident Facts 63, published by the National Safety Council
(1970 ed.).
[98] The same publication, page 59, discloses that the annual death
toll for motor vehicle accidents in the United States has exceded 52,000
in each of the last five calendar years. Thus, the annual motor vehicle
carnage approximates the total number of lives lost during the entire
Vietnam conflict beginning in 1961.
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTEHERE *****
[99] *fn1 See Reviser's Note, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1101.
[100] *fn2 Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1143 , the owner or
operator of a car involved in an accident need not post security as
required by 28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971): (1) if the accident caused injury
or damage to no person or property other than the owner's car or the
operator's person; (2) if the car was parked when involved in the
accident, unless it was parked illegally or did not carry a legally
sufficient complement of lights; (3) if the car was being driven or was
parked by another without the owner's express or implied permission; (4)
if prior to date for suspension the person whose license or registration
would be suspended files with the superintendent a release, a final
adjudication of nonliability, a confession of judgment, or some other
written settlement agreement providing for payment, in installments, of
an agreed amount of damages with respect to claims arising from the
accident; or (5) if the driver at the time of the accident was driving a
vehicle owned, operated, or leased by his employer with the employer's
permission; in that case the security and suspension provisions apply
only to the owner-employer's registration of vehicles not covered by
insurance or other bond.
[101] *fn3 This section further provides that the superintendent may
employ suspension a second time as a means of enforcing payment should
there be a default on installment obligations arising under a confession
of judgment or a written settlement agreement. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
28-1144 (3).
[102] *fn4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1102 (Supp. 1970-1971) defines
"judgment," for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
as "any judgment which has become final . . . , upon a cause of action
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, for
damages . . . or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement
for such damages."
[103] *fn5 Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1161 , a similar notice
must also be forwarded to officials in the home State of a nonresident
judgment debtor.
[104] *fn6 "A. The superintendent upon receipt of a certified copy of
a judgment, shall forthwith suspend the license and registration and
nonresident operating privilege of a person against whom the judgment
was rendered, except as otherwise provided in this section and §
28-1165."
[105] *fn7 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1163 . Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
28-1164 (Supp. 1970-1971) defines when a judgment is "paid." Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 28-1165 sets forth a procedure for paying judgments in
installments. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1162 provides that if a
creditor consents in writing and the debtor furnishes proof of financial
responsibility, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1167, the debtor's
license and registration may be restored in the superintendent's
discretion. After six months, however, the creditor's consent is
revocable provided the judgment debt remains unpaid.
[106] *fn8 Sections 28-1167 through 28-1178 set forth the requirements
for various forms of proof. Under § 28-1178, the judgment debtor is
apparently able to regain his license and registration to operate a
motor vehicle without proof of financial responsibility after three
years from the date such proof was first required of him, if during that
period the superintendent has not received any notice -- and notice can
come from other States -- of a conviction or forfeiture of bail which
would require or permit the suspension or revocation of the driver's
license and if the individual is not involved in litigation arising from
an accident covered by the security he posted. If the driver required to
post financial security does so, and is involved as an owner or operator
in another accident resulting in personal injury or property damage
within one year prior to the date he requests permission to cancel his
security, the superintendent may not permit cancellation.
[107] *fn9 U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
[108] *fn10 Mr. and Mrs. Perez also alleged in their complaint that
certain provisions of the Arizona Act imposed involuntary servitude in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and denied Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection. They also claimed that portions of the
Arizona Act operated as a bill of attainder in violation of Art. I, §
10, of the Constitution. The District Judge, in refusing to request the
convening of a three-judge court, ruled that these constitutional claims
were "obviously insubstantial." The Court of Appeals agreed. 421 F.2d
619, 625 (CA9 1970). Because of our resolution of this case, we express
no opinion as to the substantiality of any of petitioners' other
constitutional claims.
[109] *fn11 As discussed below, the majorities in Kesler and Reitz
also seemed unwilling to be bound by, or even to look for, state court
constructions of the financial responsibility laws before them. See
infra, at 652-654. It is clear, however, from even a cursory examination
of decisions in other States that the conclusion of the Arizona Supreme
Court as to the purpose of the financial responsibility law is by no
means unusual. See, e. g., Sullivan v. Cheatham, 264 Ala. 71, 76, 84 So.
2d 374, 378 (1955) ("The purpose of the [Motor Vehicle
Safety-Responsibility] Act is clearly to require and establish financial
responsibility for every owner or operator of a motor vehicle 'in any
manner involved in an accident.' . . . The Act is designed to protect
all persons having claims arising out of highway accidents."); Escobedo
v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876, 222 P. 2d 1, 5
(1950) ("The state chose to allow financially irresponsible licensed
operators to drive until they became involved in an accident with the
consequences described in the [financial responsibility law] and their
financial irresponsibility was thus brought to the attention of the
department, and then to require suspension of their licenses."); People
v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 215-216, 363 P. 2d 180, 183 (1961) ("The
requirement of C. R. S. '53, 13-7-7, that the director of revenue, '. .
. shall suspend the license of each operator and all registrations of
each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in [an] accident .
. .' unless such persons deposit a sum 'sufficient in the judgment of
the director . . .' to pay any damage which may be awarded, or otherwise
show ability to indemnify the other party to the accident against
financial loss, has nothing whatever to do with the protection of the
public safety, health, morals or welfare. It is a device designated and
intended to bring about the posting of security for the payment of a
private obligation without the slightest indication that any legal
obligation exists on the part of any person. The public gets no
protection whatever from the deposit of such security. This is not the
situation which we find in some states where the statutes require public
liability insurance as a condition to be met before a driver's license
will issue. Such statute protects the public. The statute before us is
entirely different. In the matters to which we have particularly
directed attention, C. R. S. '53, 13-7-7, is unconstitutional. On a
matter so obviously basic and fundamental no additional citation of
authority is required. We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the fact
that other jurisdictions have seemingly overlooked basic constitutional
guarantees which must be ignored in reaching an opposite conclusion.");
Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 208, 120 A. 2d 700, 703 (1956) ("The
purpose of the legislature in enacting the financial responsibility
provisions . . . was to keep off our highways the financially
irresponsible owner or operator of an automobile who cannot respond in
damages for the injuries he may inflict, and to require him, as a
condition for securing or retaining a registration or an operator's
license, to furnish adequate means of satisfying possible claims against
him."); City of St. Paul v. Hoffmann, 223 Minn. 76, 77-78, 25 N. W. 2d
661, 662-663 (1946) ("The apparent objective of the safety
responsibility act is to provide financial responsibility for injuries
and damages suffered in motor vehicle traffic. It seeks to achieve its
objective solely by the suspension of licenses. While its announced
purpose is to promote safety of travel, its provisions take effect after
an accident happens and subject drivers and owners of vehicles involved
to suspension of their 'licenses' unless liability insurance coverage
equivalent to that required by the act is carried by the owner or driver
of the vehicle. . . . The purpose of the act was to effect financial
responsibility to injured persons."); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N. H.
314, 318, 197 A. 701, 704 (1938) ("Two reasons were thought to avail for
sustaining such a law. One was its character as a regulation of the use
of public highways and the other was its capacity to secure public
safety in dangerous agencies and operations. This latter reason has
slight if any evidence for its factual support. Certainly, in the
absence of known experience and statistics, it is doubtful whether the
insured owner's car, driven either by himself or another, may be
considered to be operated more carefully than one whose owner is
uninsured. But protection in securing redress for injured highway
travelers is a proper subject of police regulation, as well as
protection from being injured. It is a reasonable incident of the
general welfare that financially irresponsible persons be denied the use
of the highway with their cars, regardless of the competency of
themselves or others as the drivers."). For legislative statements to
the effect that financial responsibility laws are designed to secure
compensation for injured victims, see, e. g., Alaska Stat. 28.20.010
(1970); Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 463, 259
S. W. 2d 177, 180 (1953) (quoting emergency clause enacted by the Texas
Legislature in connection with its financial responsibility law); S.
Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953) (Report of the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia on the financial responsibility
law proposed for the District).
[110] *fn12 See Reitz, 314 U.S., at 40-43 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
[111] Under Art. 3 of the Arizona Act, dealing with the posting of
security for damages arising from a particular accident, the victim may
cut the superintendent out by executing a release from liability or
agreeing to some other written settlement or confession of judgment
providing for payment of some damages, in installments or otherwise.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1143 (4) discussed in n. 2, supra. Assuming
that such an agreement or confession of judgment providing for
installment payments is filed with the superintendent, it prevents him
from suspending driving privileges for failure to post the amount of
financial security the superintendent determines to be necessary;
however, if the careless driver later defaults on one installment, the
victim may give notice to the superintendent, who must then use his
power of suspension to either coerce full payment or the posting of
security. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 28-1144 (3), discussed in n. 3, supra.
[112] Under Art. 4, dealing with suspension for nonpayment of a
judgment, the victim who has chosen to reduce his claim to judgment
maintains substantial control over the suspension of driving privileges
if the judgment remains unsatisfied 60 days after entry. He may consent
that the judgment debtor's driving privileges not be suspended, but the
debtor still must furnish proof of financial responsibility for the
future. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1162 . For an argument that a similar
provision delegating to judgment creditors the right to choose which
careless drivers who do not pay judgments shall escape suspension
conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act see Kesler, 369 U.S., at 179-182
(Warren, C. J., dissenting). If the judgment debtor is able to secure a
discretionary court order permitting him to pay a judgment in
installments under § 28-1165 , the creditor may cause suspension of
driving privileges until the judgment is fully satisfied by notifying
the superintendent of any default in payment of the installments. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1165 . Again, however, the judgment debtor must
still give proof of financial responsibility for the future. See Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1165 .
[113] *fn13 Kesler also decided a jurisdictional question, holding
that a Supremacy Clause challenge to a state statute was required to be
heard by a three-judge district court under 28 U. S. C. § 2281. See 369
U.S., at 155-158. This jurisdictional part of the decision was overruled
almost four years later in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965).
[114] *fn14 It also seems clear that even under the logic of Kesler
and Reitz Mrs. Perez should not have lost her driving privileges. She
was not present when the accident occurred, and no act or omission on
her part contributed to it. Because the automobile was community
property under Arizona law and because judgment was confessed as to her
in the Pinkerton negligence action, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
loss of Mrs. Perez' license "is the price an Arizona wife must pay for
negligent driving by her husband of the community vehicle" when the
resulting judgment is not paid. 421 F.2d, at 624. The Kesler and Reitz
assumption that depriving uninsured motorists of the full relief
afforded by a discharge in bankruptcy would prompt careful driving is
without foundation when applied to Mrs. Perez. As the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has stated in a recent decision involving similar
facts:
[115] "Even accepting the fiction that, as applied to drivers, motor
vehicle responsibility statutes are intended to promote safety, it is
just too much fiction to contend that, applied to a judgment debtor held
vicariously liable for the omission of a sub-agent, the statute is
anything but a means for the enforcement of judgments." Miller v.
Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 118 (CA3 1970) (en banc).
[116] *fn15 See S. Rep. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R.
Rep. No. 208, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (both presenting a summary of
the provisions of the proposed statute dealing with "Financial
Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Operators in the District of Columbia,"
but failing to mention the fact that a discharge in bankruptcy of an
accident judgment would have no effect on suspension of driving
privileges for failure to satisfy such judgment); H. R. Conf. Rep. No.
799, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (Conference Report making no mention
of anti-discharge provision); 79 Cong. Rec. 272-273 (Senate); 79 Cong.
Rec. 3416-3417, 4621-4629, 4631-4641, 6556-6564 (House). Some members of
the House, which debated some aspects of the financial responsibility
law concept rather extensively in 1935, demonstrated in debate that they
were totally unaware of any of the provisions designed to enforce
payment of a judgment for injuries caused by the first accident of a
financially irresponsible driver. See 79 Cong. Rec. 4624 (remarks of
Reps. Fitzpatrick and Sisson); id., at 4625 (remarks of Rep. Hull).
[117] When the present District of Columbia financial responsibility
law was enacted in 1954, debate was much more limited and the reports of
the House and Senate District Committees were quite brief. Except for
the reading of the bill, no mention was made of the anti-discharge
provision. See S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H. R. Rep.
No. 1448, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 99 Cong. Rec. 8950-8951; 100 Cong.
Rec. 6281-6287, 6347-6348.
[118] *fn16 S. Rep. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); H. R.
Rep. No. 208, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935); 79 Cong. Rec. 4626-4627
(remarks of Rep. Norton, chairman of the House District Committee). In
reference to the present version of the financial responsibility act,
see S. Rep. No. 515, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953); H. R. Rep. No.
1448, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1954); 100 Cong. Rec. 6287 (remarks of
Rep. Talle); id., at 6347 (remarks of Sen. Beall).
[119] MINORITY OPINIONFOOTNOTES
[120] *fn1 See Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 672.
[121] *fn2 The petitioners urge upon us only the Supremacy Clause.
[122] *fn3 In 1943 some of the motor vehicle uniform laws were
"withdrawn from active promulgation pending further study" by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 9B U. L. A.
Table III, xix, xxii, xxiii. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's detailed
review of the development of state legislation and of the uniform laws
in this field in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153,
158-168 (1962).
[123] *fn4 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in part, would have
upheld the Utah statutes other than that "which gives to a creditor the
discretion of determining if and when driving privileges may be restored
by the State. . . ." 369 U.S., at 179-182.
[124] *fn5 Public Law 365 replaced the Act of May 3, 1935, 49 Stat.
166, known as the Owners' Financial Responsibility Act of the District
of Columbia. Section 3 of the earlier Act provided, 49 Stat. 167, that a
judgment's discharge in bankruptcy, as distinguished from other
discharge, would not relieve the judgment debtor from suspension.
[125] *fn6 Ala. Code, Tit. 36, § 74 (55) (Supp. 1969); Alaska Stat. §
28.20.350 (1962); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1457 (1957); Cal. Vehicle Code §
16372 (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-25 (2) (Supp. 1965); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Rev. § 14-131 (1966); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 21, § 2943 (1953);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 287-17 (1968); Idaho Code § 49-1514 (1967); Ill.
Ann. Stat., c. 95 1/2, § 7-310 (1971); Iowa Code § 321A.14 (2) (1971);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-744 (b) (1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 187.420 (1962); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:893 (1963); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29, § 783 (6)
(1964) (10 years); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66 1/2, § 7-315 (1970); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 257.513 (b) (Supp. 1956); Minn. Stat. § 170.33, subd. 5
(1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 8285-14 (b) (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.110
(1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 53-431 (1961); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-519
(1968); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 485.303 (1968); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268:9
(1966); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6-35 (Supp. 1971); N. M. Stat. Ann.
64-24-78 (1960); N. Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 337 (c) (1970); N. C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-279.14 (Supp. 1969); N. D. Cent. Code § 39-16.1-04 (5) (Supp.
1969); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4509.43 (Supp. 1970); Okla. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 47, § 7-315 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 75, § 1414 (1960); R. I.
Gen. Laws Ann. § 31-32-15 (1969); S. C. Code Ann. § 46-748 (Supp. 1960);
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-35-58 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1236
(1968); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6701h, § 14 (b) (1969); Utah
Code Ann. § 41-12-15 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 802 (b) (1967);
Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-444 (a)(4) (Supp. 1970) (15 years); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 46.29.380 (1967); W. Va. Code Ann. § 17D-4-6 (1966); Wis. Stat.
344.26 (2) (1967) [cf. Zywicke v. Brogli, 24 Wis. 2d 685, 130 N. W. 2d
180 (1964)]; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-299 (1967).
[126] See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 324.131 (1968) and Op. Atty. Gen.
059-200 (1959); Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (e)(3) (Supp. 1970); Ind. Ann.
Stat. 47-1049 (1965) and Op. Atty. Gen. 1936, p. 272; Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., c. 90, § 22A (Supp. 1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 486.211 (5) (1967).
[127] *fn7 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting, in Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S., at 133.
[128] + Rounded.
[129] * Includes deaths from disease, accidents, etc.
***** END FOOTNOTEHERE *****
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are
available in the print version]
Republished on the DadsNow Website by written permission of Versuslaw.
Copyright 1996 VersusLaw, Inc. (206) 250-0142.
http://www.versuslaw.com
19710601
1971.SCT.105